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State Representation of 
Children’s Interests
NAOMI CAHN*
I. Introduction
Who represents a child’s interests? We generally believe that the 
parents have primary responsibility for a child and that, where parents are
unable to assert responsibility, the state acts in parens patriae to protect
the child’s interests in a series of different contexts. But does the state
always do this? What are the parameters of the state’s role in representing
and protecting children’s interests? Although the role of attorneys and
guardians ad litem in representing children has received a great deal of
attention,1 the role of the state—outside of a few settings, such as the fos-
ter care system—has been more presumed than explored. The state, as the
ultimate third party—and outsider—to the parent–child relationship,
affects the very definition of the family, and shapes the rights and status
of parents and children.
In examining the role that third parties enjoy with respect to children
and the role those claims play in defining family, this paper explores how
the interests of minors are represented in both national and international law
in three contexts: first, in restricting the abortion rights of minors, the state
claims to be protecting them; second, in allowing parents to decide who
will act as caretaker for their children if both parents are dead, the state
defers to parents’ wishes; and third, in countries where the state cannot
protect children and the exercise of rights in court is virtually meaning-
less, it is nongovernmental organizations who speak on behalf of minors.
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. Thanks to June Carbone,
Joanna Grossman, Fred Lawrence, and Catherine Ross for all kinds of help and support.
1. See, e.g., Barbara Ann Atwood, Representing Children: The Search for Clear and
Workable Standards, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 183 (2005).
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There is already skepticism about the state’s ability to represent chil-
dren’s interests in a variety of contexts. Many have challenged the state’s
implementation of the abuse and neglect system, with questions about
race and class,2 and others have challenged conventional norms suggest-
ing that the state is deferential to the nuclear family.3 In examining the
state’s role in speaking for children, this article serves as both a critique
and a defense. The state’s actions and efficacy in advocating the interests
of minors is context-dependent; there are contexts in which the state’s
stated agenda of protecting children really is primary, while in other situ-
ations, the state has another agenda or the state may be altogether inca-
pable of acting at all. This article briefly reviews the development of state
intervention on behalf of children and possible legal and conceptual
frameworks for examining the rights of, and representation of, children
before turning to the three different contexts for examining the efficacy
and parameters of the state’s role.
II. State Intervention
This section provides a brief introduction to the parameters of state
intervention. It will explore the constitutional basis for, and the limits on,
state intervention into the parent–child relationship, and then explore the
historical origins for such intervention. Supreme Court cases have held
that parents are constitutionally entitled to raise a child in the manner that
they choose and parents are generally better able, as a prudential, prag-
matic matter, to judge what will benefit their children than is the state.4
Although the rights were originally developed as extensions of the com-
mon-law liberty rights applicable to contract, more modern articulations
have attempted to ground them in the Constitution.5 In Meyer v. Nebraska,
the Court held that the right of liberty “denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage
2. See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE
(2001); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992). Catherine J. Ross & Naomi R. Cahn, Subsidy for
Caretaking in Families: Lessons from Foster Care, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 55
(1999).
3. See, e.g., Joanna Grossman, Fear and Loathing in Massachusetts: Same-Sex Marriage
and Some Lessons from the History of Marriage and Divorce, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 87, 100–02
(2004) (discussing impact of state variation in marriage laws); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon
of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 893–95 (2004) (discussing how welfare law may inti-
mately affect family structure).
4. See, e.g., Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, Child, and the
State, 2004 U. CHI. L. FORUM 27, 31.
5. Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Mining of the New
Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 472–73 (2001).
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in any of the common occupations of life . . . to marry, establish a home
and bring up children.”6 The Court explained that, although it had never
hazarded a definitive explanation of the liberty guaranteed pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, “[w]ithout doubt” that liberty included the right
to raise children.7 The cases that it cited for this proposition included the
now somewhat discredited precedents of the Slaughter-House Cases, Yick
Wo, Allgeyer, Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, and others.8
The rationale supporting parental rights in Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters is
phrased as harking back to Meyer: “The fundamental theory of liberty
upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the State to standardize its children. The child is not the mere
creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for addi-
tional obligations.”9 And in Yoder, the final case of the trilogy, the Court
notes: “This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children
is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition. If
not the first, perhaps the most significant statements of the Court in this
area are found in Pierce . . .”10 The Court observed that parental control
over their children’s religious and educational upbringing has “a high
place in our society,” and the state’s interest in education must be bal-
anced against “the traditional interest of parents with respect to the reli-
gious upbringing of their children.” In Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme
Court reiterated that parents have a basic right to raise their children, and
that the decisions of fit parents should receive “special weight.”11 Within
the intact nuclear family, the strong presumption is that parents act in their
child’s best interests.
Parents’ basic rights become attenuated as soon as the fitness of the
parent(s) becomes questionable or once there is no longer an intact fami-
ly.12 Indeed, while courts pay deference to the notion of parental control,
6. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). In a much less famous case decided
shortly after Pierce, the Court held that restrictions on teaching foreign languages in Hawaii
deprived “Japanese parents” of the right to direct their children’s education. Farrington v.
Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
10. Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
11. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 59 (2000).
12. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual System of
Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, Part I & II, 16 STANFORD L. REV.
257, 258–91, 900 (1964 and 1965); Naomi R. Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1225, 1242–44 (1999); Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the
Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299 (2002).
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the state can remove children from their parents for abuse and neglect,
require some form of schooling, and establish a minimum work age for
children.13 Moreover, the reasoning that supports parental autonomy even
in intact families is, at best, somewhat questionable, given the difficulty
evidenced in the earlier decisions in finding a constitutional basis for 
parents’ fundamental rights.
In addition to the difficulty of finding a constitutional basis for parents’
rights, the historical origins of the state’s role in protecting children, and
the parameters of that role, are somewhat obscure. The state’s authority to
protect children is generally traced through the historical development of
the doctrine of parens patriae and the English Poor Laws.14 Each of these
provided a foundation for state intervention in the intact family. By the
early seventeenth century, the English Poor Laws allowed the state to
remove children from their parents’ custody when their parents could not
support them.15 These laws were echoed in the American colonies’ approach
to poor children, who could be removed from their homes notwithstand-
ing their parents’ objections.16
The English Court of Chancery parens patriae authority probably
developed from its jurisdiction as the guardian of the property of wealthy
orphans, and expanded in the seventeenth century to include concerns
over the child’s care.17 In the United States, the doctrine was used in the
early nineteenth century to justify state removal of children from their
homes, and, by the end of the nineteenth century, it had become the basis
for the development of the juvenile court.18 Today it is used as the basis
for any state intervention on behalf of children in the family based on a
belief that the state has a duty to act in the best interest of the child. 
For example, when parents choose not to seek medical treatment for their
children based on religious beliefs, the state will often assert its parens
patriae interest and seek a court order allowing the state to consent to the
13. See e.g., Catherine Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counsel for Children
in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571, 1586 (1996).
14. See, e.g., Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court,
23 S.C. L. Rev. 205 (1971); Kathleen S. Bean, Changing the Rules: Public Access to
Dependency Court, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 12–25 (2001) (tracing the development of modern
juvenile dependency laws); John Seymour, Parens Patriae and Warship Powers: Their Nature
and Origins, 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994).
15. Bean, supra note 14, at 14–16.
16. See Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from
Welfare “Reform,” Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 702-03 (1998); Mark
R. Brown, Rescuing Children from Abusive Parents: The Constitutional Value of Pre-
Deprivation Process, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 913, 939 (2004).
17. See, e.g., Rendleman, supra note 14.
18. See Bean, supra note 14.
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treatment on behalf of the sick child.19 The state justifies its actions by
articulating a “best interest of the child” standard.
The Supreme Court, in recognizing the state’s authority to act in parens
patriae, cautioned against governmental overreaching. In Gault, the court
stated:
We [have] stated that the Juvenile Court Judge’s exercise of the power of the
state as parens patriae was not unlimited. We said that the admonition to func-
tion in a “parental” relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness.20
Nonetheless, the basic precept that the state can act to protect children
remains unquestioned; it is the manner in which that protection is exer-
cised that creates potential constitutional conflict.
III. Frameworks for Addressing the State’s
Representation of Children’s Rights
This section articulates various conceptions of the nature and strength
of children’s rights. It then discusses various theoretical frameworks for
considering the substantive goals that the state should, or does, pursue in
its representation of children’s interests. These substantive goals depend
on different perspectives on the relative weights of parents’ and children’s
interests.
A. Children’s Rights
Given the strong recognition of the rights of both parents and the state,
children can be difficult to situate within the legal system. Although they
have clearly recognized rights in some contexts, their rights are not iden-
tical to those of adults.21 When children’s interests in a particular legal
proceeding may be different from their parents’ or the state’s, they are
sometimes entitled to their own attorneys, although the most common
context for representing children involves articulating their rights against
the state, as in juvenile delinquency or other criminal cases.22 If a third
19. See, e.g., Michelle Oberman & Joel Frader, Dying Children and Medical Research:
Access to Clinical Trials as Benefit and Burden, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 301, 314 n.42 (2003); see
also Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose Body Is It Anyway? An Updated Model of Healthcare
Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 251, 262–69 (2005)
(discussing other exceptions to the general rule of parental consent to medical decision-making,
such as a minor’s emancipation).
20. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
21. See, e.g., Annette Apell, Uneasy Tensions Between Children’s Rights and Civil Rights,
5 NEV. L.J. 141 (2004); Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging Right for Mature Minors to Receive
Information, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 223, 265 (1999).
22. See, e.g., Catherine Ross, Implementing Constitutional Rights for Juveniles: The Parent–
Child Privilege in Context, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 85 (2003); Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction 
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party claims to be representing children’s interests, as a child’s attorney,
guardian ad litem, or when the child is part of a larger group (such as by
a nonprofit nongovernmental organization),23 there are difficult issues
concerning the parameters of that representation. As a background to the
dispute over the state’s representation, this section briefly reviews these
other possible representatives.
Parents, who have the right to the “care, custody, and control” of their
children, can ordinarily be expected to act in their children’s interests.
Whether children have reciprocal rights against their parents is, however,
much less settled. While children are recognized as capable of holding
and exercising constitutional rights, such rights are most practically
asserted where parents and children agree or where the child seeks to
exercise rights in criminal or administrative proceedings. Asserting a sep-
arate right on behalf of the child realistically requires the willingness to
recognize tensions with established parental decision-making rights.24
Constitutional decision-making has, instead, overwhelmingly focused
on parents’ rights: Do unmarried fathers have the right to veto the adop-
tion of their newborn children? Do custodial parents have the right to
determine the terms of grandparent visitation? Do biological parents have
constitutional rights with respect to their children? Such rights nonethe-
less involve a measure of reciprocity with children’s interests. Family law
decision-making for younger children generally involves a triad of par-
ties: either mother–father–child, or parent–child–state. The assertion of a
right by one almost inevitably involves restricting the rights of the others.
If, for example, the parents have a thick constitutional right to decide what
is in their children’s best interests, then the child lacks a corresponding
right to compel parents to act in accordance with that best interest stan-
dard. The absence of a right, on the other hand, does not necessarily dic-
tate a particular outcome. Instead, it may leave the issue open to public-
policy balancing. If, for example, a parent does not have a constitutional
right to veto an abortion favored by the child, then a state may still choose
to permit the parent some involvement in his daughter’s decision. In such
of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 577 (2002);
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Enhancing Children’s Participation in Policy Formation, 45
ARIZ. L. REV. 751 (2003).
23. For the classic discussion of how an individual client’s interests might conflict with
those of other group members or the lawyer’s agenda, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two
Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE
L.J. 470 (1976).
24. See, e.g., Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism and Rights: Client-Counseling Theory
and the Role of Child’s Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 253–55
(2005); Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637 (2006).
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a setting, the formal recognition of children’s rights may be less critical
than the question of what public policies influence the child’s ability to
exercise that right.25
With the development of constitutionally based familial rights, it is
tempting for child advocates to seek enhanced rights on behalf of chil-
dren.26 But many of these rights, as conventionally understood, are ill-
suited to address the needs of many children27 because they fail to address
the reality of children’s lives, particularly their dependence on adult care-
takers, and the immaturity of children’s brains. Indeed, Professor Annette
Appell usefully distinguishes between two different aspects of children’s
rights: “civil rights,” which involve children’s rights to autonomy, expres-
sion, and freedom from state action, and “protective” or “dependency”
rights, which involve others deciding what is best for children because of
children’s dependency on others.28
Children require not only continuing and dependent29 relationships but
also connections to others.30 Legal doctrines and processes must help 
create and sustain these interconnected relationships, but also ensure that
children are protected when those relationships go awry. Protecting chil-
dren takes different forms: if children need to be protected from their
state, then the conventional discourse provides the primary role to parents,
25. See infra for further discussion of minors’ abortion decision-making rights and parental
involvement.
26. For some of the eloquent commentary on the need to establish children’s rights, see,
e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, Children’s Rights and the Need for Protection, 34 FAM. L.Q. 421
(2000); Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking Ahead: An Empowerment Perspective on the Rights
of Children, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1585 (1996); Ross, supra note 13; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
“Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 995 (1992).
27. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 24, at 655–56.
28. Appell, supra note 21 at 141, 143, 153. “The distinction between these two rights cate-
gories reflects both the difference between rights applied to children despite their minority and
rights applied because of their minority.” In this sense, children’s rights differ from those of
adults. In the United States context, the Due Process Clause thus protects against government
overreaching and undue state interference with fundamental personal decisions and beliefs. It
has not, however, been generally interpreted to require that the government act affirmatively.
See Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005); Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88
MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2318–20 (1990); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with
Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 486 (1997); Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR
ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 122–23 (1969).
29. See SARAH BLUFFER HRDY, MOTHER NURTURE: MATERNAL INSTINCTS AND HOW THEY
SHAPE THE HUMAN SPECIES (1999).
30. See Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case for
Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 150 (1999). Children who have higher levels of
care and connectedness also have diminished rates of health-threatening illnesses. Gregory
Loken, Throwaway Children and Throwaway Parenthood, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1715, 1759 (1995).
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and secondarily to the discourse of rights; if children need to be protected
from their parents, then the conventional discourse recognizes the state’s
role. The puzzle of representing children is also evidenced in questions of
when children should be entitled to counsel, and the role of counsel in
these proceedings.31
There are persuasive arguments that minors deserve counsel in all civil
proceedings.32 For example, Professor Katherine Federle argues that to
truly respect children’s rights, we must treat the children as parties to any
dispute that affects them, and, to ensure adequate representation, appoint
them counsel. She believes, for example, that children must approve any
custodial outcome that affects them.33 By contrast, Professor Martin
Guggenheim expresses deep reservations about how children are repre-
sented and their entitlement to representation.34 Indeed, in his most recent
article, he argues that children’s advocates may serve state interests in the
context of abuse and neglect.35 Consequently, rights discourse, particularly
given children’s psychological and neurological immaturities,36 may func-
tion as an imperfect method for describing the realities of children’s lives.
Moreover, when no one can help children exercise those rights, then chil-
dren must be protected in other ways. If children do not have separate rep-
resentation or adequate recognition of their rights, then this places an
increased burden on the state and parents to ensure both procedural and
substantive protections.
B. Conceptual Framework
The parameters and appropriateness of the state’s role in making claims
for children depends not just on the deference to be accorded parents but also
on a series of (overlapping) conceptual categories: parental authority versus
children’s autonomy, self-fulfillment versus fulfilling a higher purpose,37
31. See generally Ross, supra note 13 (using a discussion of rights to argue that children
should be appointed counsel in civil litigation).
32. See, e.g., id.
33. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving
Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1564 (1994).
34. See, e.g., Martin Guggeheim, Counseling Counsel for Children, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1488
(1999).
35. Martin Guggenheim, How Children’s Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6 NEV. L.J. (Spring
2006).
36. The conceptual framework and the need for representation of children’s interest is sup-
ported by neuroscientific research, which shows that children are especially vulnerable. See
Elizabeth S. Scott and Thomas Grisso, Development Incompetence, Due Process and Juvenile
Justice Policy 32–33 (2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva_publiclaw/art11;
Jennifer Drobac, “Developing Capacity:” Adolescent Consent at Work, at Law, and in the Sciences
of the Mind, 10 J. JUV. L. & POL’Y (2006).
37. Edward Rubin, Sex, Politics, and Morality, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2005).
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hierarchy versus respect for individuality, and family versus community.
If parental authority is full, then there is no need for children to ever rep-
resent themselves (or for their interests to be represented by a third party),
and state intervention should be limited strictly; on the other hand, respect
for individuality and children’s autonomy might require broader parame-
ters for state intervention, with separate representation for children in
most situations.
In thinking about different concepts of the state’s role in this potential
morass of conflicting interests, it is useful to refer to the conceptual cate-
gories articulated by George Lakoff.38 He argues that many social, politi-
cal, and cultural attitudes can be explained through the paradigm of “strict
father” versus nurturant parent. To articulate their particular vision of the
family, people generally have two different conceptions of the relationship
between parents and children. Under the “strict father” mentality, the
world is dangerous; children need to be protected, but will not act in their
best interests because they have not yet developed a sense of morality; and
it is the responsibility of the strict father to impose discipline on his chil-
dren.39 Children are born bad and learn through punishment.40
By contrast, the nurturant parent mentality views the world as basical-
ly safe, with parents responsible for nurturing their children with empathy
and responsibility.41 The role of the state is similarly based on “empathy”
and “responsibility,” on taking care of and protecting each other.42 The
state would support parents in nurturing their children, but also support
children in fulfilling their lives by, for example, providing college loans43
or offering sex education beyond abstinence programs.44
Under the “strict father” mentality, children will not have interests
independent from those of their parents; if they did, children still could
not represent their own interests because this undermines their parents’
38. GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE
DEBATE (2004); MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (2d ed. 2002).
39. MORAL POLITICS, supra note 38.
40. Interview of George Lakoff (2003), available at http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/
releases/2003/10/27_lakoff.shtml.
41. MORAL POLITICS, supra note 38.
42. George Lakoff, Framing the Dems: How Conservatives Control Political Debate and
How Liberals Can Take It Back, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 1, 2003, available at http://www.
prospect.org/print/V14/8/lakoff-g.html.
43. George Lakoff, The Body Politic, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi_m0GER/is_1999_Fall/ai_56457597/pg_2.
44. LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS, supra note 38, at 186–87. Abstinence education is based on
a worldview that sees the problem of teen pregnancy as based in a lack of self-discipline and
strong moral values. Nurturant parents might instead provide comprehensive sex education and
distribute condoms, recognizing that adolescence is a time of experimentation, and that maxi-
mizing teens’ chances for a fulfilling life requires helping them manage their sexuality.
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authority. Instead, the state’s role should be limited to protecting children
from themselves, or intervening only when their parents are unable to act.
But these actions are designed to punish the parents rather than, as under
a nurturant parent morality, to support both parent and child. For exam-
ple, the call to remove children from welfare mothers and place them in
orphanages represents a “strict father” approach because the mothers are
seen as immoral, while the orphanages will be able to instill the appropri-
ate values in children.45
How the state should handle children’s interests, then, depends on dif-
ferent views of parental authority and the parent–child relationship.
Although there is much overlap between the two conceptual categories,
such as the belief that the state should act in the absence of parents, there
remain two different roles of the state comparable to the underlying vision
of the family: should the state act as strict father, reinforcing hierarchy
within the family, or as nurturant parent, helping children and parents
actualize themselves. Research on which approach is best for children is,
of course, contested, and manuals on bringing up children reflect both the
stern disciplinarian model and the nurturant, promote-self-reliance model.
Ultimately, however, the research on nurturing parents shows that their
children are better equipped to handle life’s stresses.46
IV. The State’s Representation
As the above discussion shows, the state is supposed to act when par-
ents cannot, or when there is a strong need to override parental authority
to protect a child. The standard for state intervention, however, is not
whether parents are acting in their children’s best interest, but whether
there is some showing of parental unfitness (at least outside of poor fam-
ilies and those receiving federal benefits) or the unavailability of parents.
The state justifies its actions as promoting the best interests of the child,
which is a similar standard to that for appointing a guardian, and differs
from the responsibility of attorneys to represent their clients’ interests as
articulated by the client.47 But deciding on the parameters of when the
state should act turns on different visions of how the state should respond.
This section provides three illustrations of state actions that suggest the
45. Id. at 185–86.
46. See LAKOFF, supra note 38, at 348–365); Drobac, supra note 36 (discussing permis-
siveness and limits on adolescent autonomy).
47. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.14., comment [1] provides: “The normal
client–lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and
assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters. When the client is a minor . . .
[the client] often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about
matters affecting the client’s own well-being.”
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differing roles that a state may assume. As the first example involving
minors’ abortion rights shows, the state’s actions in parens patriae may
say more about the state’s more general morality interests than the state’s
obligations to children, and seems to be in accord with a “strict father”
mentality of reinforcing the parental role because the minor is unable to
make her own decisions. The second example, involving state deferral to
parents’ choice for a guardian when both parents have died, shows the tra-
ditional respect for parental control and autonomy although with the
requirement that the appointment of the guardian be in the best interest of
the child, shows the state acting in the true meaning of parens patriae, and
is probably in accord with a vision of the state shared by adherents of both
the “strict father” and nurturant parent moralities. Here the state really is
acting in the child’s best interest, with appropriate deferral to parental
authority. The final example highlights the situation where the state is
unable to act either in its own interests or on behalf of children; other enti-
ties, such as multilateral institutions or nongovernment organizations must
fulfill the paternal/parental role. Through these examples, we see differing
contexts in which the state intervenes, and can evaluate the efficacy and
values of these interventions.
1. WHEN THE STATE USES MINOR’S INTERESTS AS A POLITICAL COVER
Most states have enacted statutes that require one or both parents to be
involved in their daughters’ abortion decision-making process through
either parental consent or notification provisions, unless a limited set of
exceptions apply.48 Nevertheless, “a State may not restrict access to abor-
tions that are necessary in appropriate medical judgment, for preservation
of the life or health of the mother.”49 In 1976, the Supreme Court first 
considered parental involvement laws, striking down a Missouri statute
that required parental consent, unless the abortion was necessary to save
the life of the child.50 The Court’s language, however, acknowledged that
the state could limit the rights of children in a manner not applicable to
adults, but concluded that the medical decision-making restriction in that
case was unconstitutional.51
In subsequent cases, the Court has upheld statutes requiring parental
consent, so long as they include a judicial bypass procedure that would
allow a mature minor to make her own abortion decision, or that would
48. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 126 S. Ct. 961, 966 n.1 (noting that forty-four states have
enacted laws mandating parental involvement). In four of those states, there is no exception to
the parental involvement requirement based on an emergency concerning the minor’s health).
49. Id. at 976 (cites omitted).
50. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
51. Id. at 74–75.
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permit an abortion to occur if it were in the child’s best interest.52 The
Court has similarly upheld parental notification statutes that include a
judicial bypass proceeding, although some notification laws may be con-
stitutional even without a bypass procedure.53 The Court has also stated
that parental notification laws must include an exception where the abor-
tion is necessary to the life or health of the minor. Pursuant to most judi-
cial bypass statutes, a minor will be permitted to proceed with an abortion
if she shows either: (i) she is sufficiently mature and informed to make the
abortion decision herself; or (ii) even if she is not sufficiently mature and
informed, the abortion is in her best interest.
An overwhelming majority of states require some form of parental
involvement, generally subject to the judicial bypass option. In twenty-
one states, parental consent is required before a minor can obtain an abor-
tion, with two states mandating that both parents consent, while in thirteen
states, parental notification is required.54 In another nine states—Alaska,
California, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
and New Mexico—enforcement of statutes requiring parental involvement
has been permanently enjoined.55 Seven states—Connecticut, Hawaii,
Maine, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington—do not require any
form of parental involvement in minors’ abortion decisions.56
The parental involvement laws are generally justified as protecting
children by ensuring that they communicate with their parents, rather than
as flat-out restrictions on abortion.57 Nonetheless, the Court has observed
that state regulation of abortion which “express[es] a profound respect for
the life of the unborn child are permitted, if they are not a substantial
obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.”58 Indeed, in their
implementation of the judicial bypass, judges may mandate that the minor
receive counseling from an anti-abortion organization.59
52. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899–900 (1992); Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 4443 U.S. 622 (1979).
53. In Hodgson, six Justices would have voted to uphold the validity of a one-parent 
notification requirement with a bypass procedure, see 497 U.S. at 480 (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part), while five justices would have voted to uphold a
two-parent notification with a judicial bypass. Id. at 390. See Richard Storrow & Sandra
Martinez, “Special Weight” for Best-Interests Minors in the New Era of Parental Autonomy,
WIS. L. REV. 789, 796 (2003).
54. Guttmacher Institute, Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions (Jan. 1, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PIMA.pdf.
55. Id.
56. All of these states are “blue” states, meaning that they voted Democratic in the 2004
election.  
57. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa., 505 U.S. at 895; Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 417.
58. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa., 505 U.S. at 877 (plurality).
59. See Helena Silverstein & Kathryn Lundwall Alessi, Religious Establishment in Hearings
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In its 2006 decision in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, the Court con-
sidered, but deferred decision on, a parental involvement law that required
notification unless the abortion was necessary to prevent the minor’s
death, or the abortion is authorized pursuant to a judicial bypass proce-
dure.60 In Ayotte, New Hampshire justified its parental notification statute,
noting that it could enact a law which:
“create[s] a structural mechanism by which the State, or a parent or guardian of
a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn . . . if they are
not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.” []
New Hampshire’s Act does not create a substantial obstacle to any woman’s
choice to have an abortion; it provides minors with the benefit of parental guid-
ance and assistance in exercising a tough choice. . . . 
[D]espite . . . this Court’s clear recognition of the important role parents play
in assisting their unemancipated daughters in exercising their right to choose,
the court of appeals struck down New Hampshire’s entire notification act.
According to the state, parental notification statutes serve several com-
pelling state interests, including protecting the emotional and physical
health of the pregnant mother, vindicating the importance of the par-
ent–child relationship, and promoting the family unit.61
Research on the effectiveness of these laws, however, challenges
whether the parental involvement statutes actually do protect children, or
whether they serve, instead, state interests in banning abortion and con-
formance to a strict father mentality. In his dissent in an earlier case
including a minor parental notification statute, Justice Blackmun charged,
the legislature has essentially proclaimed, “If the courts of the United
States insist on upholding a limited right to an abortion, let us make that
abortion as difficult as possible to obtain.”62
There are no studies that show improved parental communication as a
result of parental involvement laws.63 While the statutes generally contain
to Waive Parental Consent for Consent to Abortion, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 473, 492–93 (2004)
(discussing practice in three Alabama counties to require counseling from “pro-life counseling”
at the “Sav-A-Life” center).
60. Ayotte, 126 S. Ct. 961
61. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, Brief for Petitioners, 2004 U.S. Briefs 1144, (2005) (pp.
*10–*12). Teresa Stanton Collett notes that parental notification laws can benefit minors
through improving medical care and providing protection from sexual assault. Teresa Stanton
Collett, Protecting Our Daughters: The Need for Parental Notification Law, 26 VT. L. REV.
101, 102 (2001).
62. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Servs., 497 U.S. 502, 541–42 (1990) (Blackmun, J. dis-
senting).
63. Cynthia Dailard & Chinue Turner Richardson, Teenagers’ Access to Confidential
Reproductive Health Services, Guttmacher Report on Public Policy (8)(4), 6, 9 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/08/4/gr080406.pdf.
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procedural protections for minors by requiring the state to appoint an
attorney or guardian ad litem to help them through the process, these
processes do not necessarily translate into substantive protection of the
rights of minors.64 In a careful study of the effectiveness of various “pro-
life” laws in reducing a state’s abortion rate, Michael New found that
abortion rates decreased in states where notification laws were in effect,
as opposed to states where notification laws, while enacted, had been judi-
cially enjoined.65 The study hypothesized that the political climate in both
sets of states were similar, as each had enacted comparable statutes, and
noted that enactment of these laws was “not a random occurrence.” Given
the same set of enactments but differential effectiveness, the decline in
abortion rates, thus, must be traced to the impact of the laws, rather than
cultural and religious attitudes towards abortion.
Other studies have examined the correlation between parental involve-
ment statutes and teen birth and pregnancy rates; interpreting these studies
in light of the state’s political orientation provides additional information
as to the rationale for the parental involvement statutes. The states that
have enacted these laws tend to be more conservative, at least based on
voting patterns from the most recent national elections. The birthrates were
highest in those states that had enacted parental consent laws and that
voted Republican in the 2004 election (Mississippi, where both parents
must consent; Texas; Arizona, Arkansas, and New Mexico, although the
parental consent law has been enjoined there); the abortion rates were
highest in New Jersey, New York, Maryland, California, and Nevada, only
one of which (New York) does not have a parental involvement statute
64. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE § 33.003 (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705 (2005); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 3206 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.01114 (2005). In Texas, the court must
appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor, who may also be appointed as the minor’s attorney.
See generally Elizabeth Susan Graybill, Note: Assisting Minors Seeking Abortions in Judicial
Bypass Proceedings: A Guardian ad Litem Is No Substitute for an Attorney, 55 VAND. L. REV.
581 (2002).
65. Michael J. New, Using Natural Experiments to Analyze the Impact of State Legislation
on the Incidence of Abortion (2006), available at www.heritage.org/Researc/Family/cda06-
01.cfm. He found:
when a parental involvement law is enacted, the abortion rate decreases by 16.37 abor-
tions for every thousand live births [the abortion ratio] and the abortion rate decreases by
1.15 abortions for every thousand women between the ages of 15 to 44 [the abortion
rate]. Parental involvement laws that are passed and then nullified by the judiciary result
in modest increases in the abortion rate and a modest decline in the abortion ration.
Id. at 11.
Of course, proponents of these laws would argue that a decrease in the number of abortions
is in children’s best interests, rather than the state’s. Yet given the lack of research on effec-
tiveness in increasing parental–child communication, and the impact of having a child on a
minor’s future life choices, these arguments are not entirely convincing.
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(although the statutes have been enjoined in New Jersey, California, and
Nevada), and only one of which voted Republican in the 2004 election;
and the abortion rates were lowest in Utah, South Dakota, Kentucky, and
North Dakota, each of which mandates some form of parental involvement,
and each of which voted Republican in the 2004 election.66 Of the five
states with the lowest teen-pregnancy rate, four of them (Vermont, New
Hampshire, Minnesota, and Maine) voted Democratic in the 2004 elec-
tion, and two of them (Vermont and Maine) did not have parental notifi-
cation laws, whereas a third, New Hampshire, has a parental notification
statute that has been permanently enjoined.67
As Carol Sanger persuasively argues, these laws are framed as repre-
senting children’s interests; instead, she explains, they represent a political
decision on behalf of third parties to prevent minors from obtaining abor-
tions, to reinforce parental authority, and to punish girls for their sexual
behavior.68 This political decision itself is a reflection of other beliefs 
concerning the family and minors. The different positions on abortion rep-
resent different approaches to girls and women’s role in contemporary
society, with the anti-choice advocates representing an attempt to “‘swing
the pendulum back’ to more traditional lifestyles.”69
These cases seem to acknowledge a child’s right to an abortion, but the
role of the mandatory judicial bypass procedures in parental involvement
statutes is simply to substitute another authority figure for the parents.70
As Lakoff explains: 
There are two classical kinds of cases [of women who want abortions].
Unmarried teenage girls who have been having sex but have been careless or
ignorant in the matter of birth control; women who want careers or independ-
ent lives . . . According to Strict Father morality, an unmarried teenage girl
should not be having teenage sex at all. . . . She has to be responsible for the
consequence of her actions if she is to learn from her mistakes. An abortion
66. Alan Guttmacher Institute, U.S. Teenage Pregnancy Statistics: Overall Trends, Trends
by Race and Ethnicity, and State-by-State Information (2004), available at www. guttmach-
er.org/pubs/state_pregnancy_trends.pdf. and Parental Involvement, supra note 54.
67. AGI, U.S. Teenage Pregnancy Statistics, supra note 66. North Dakota, which is a red
state that requires that both parents consent to a minor’s abortion, had the lowest teen-pregnancy
rate in the country. Nevada, which had the highest teen-pregnancy rate in the country, is a red
state whose law has been enjoined.
68. Carol Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States: Politics and Policy,
18 INTL. J.L. & POL’Y & FAM. 305, 315 (2004).
69. KRISTEN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 239 (1984).
70. See Martin Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 589, 639 (2002) (“The abortion cases are simply a use of state power to reorder society,
shifting power over children from parents to judges when it serves an instrumental value wholly
apart from a child’s rights. . . . For those minors who, for whatever reason, choose not to seek
parental consent, a new adult was vested with the power over them”).
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would simply sanction her immoral behavior. In both of the classical stereo-
typical cases, abortion violates Strict Father morality. . . .71
By restricting access to abortion, states are imposing one vision of the
appropriate family on all children, overriding the liberty and privacy
rights of children in the interest of upholding discipline.
Although the laws are claimed to buttress parents’ already strong rights
to consent to their children’s medical treatment, all states already exempt
certain types of medical treatment from the requirement of parental con-
sent or knowledge. No state requires that a doctor notify parents when a
child is receiving medical care for sexually transmitted diseases (although
one state requires notification for a positive HIV test), and only 11 states
even permit physicians to notify parents in this situation;72 twenty-one
states allow a minor to obtain contraceptive services without notifying a
parent. The states that focus on restrictions on the abortion decision, rather
than other kinds of medical treatment, suggest that there is something spe-
cial and symbolically different about abortion.
The legal restrictions on minors’ abortion rights show the state acting
based on adults’ interests in disciplining children, not children’s interests,
using an approach that punishes children for sexual experimentation and
for making their own decisions. Rather than acting as a guardian for chil-
dren, the state is imposing a certain morality. While these restrictions can
be justified under the perspective of an authoritarian state, the state’s role
in representing minors’ interests has typically been much more complex,
protective, and nurturing than morality-enforcer.
2. ACTING IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF MINORS
While they are alive, of course, parents are presumed not just to have
authority over their children but also to serve as their legal guardians.73 
If one parent dies or has had his/her parental rights terminated, then the
surviving parent becomes the sole legal guardian.74 When both parents 
die or are incapacitated, children need caretaking. In responding to this
situation, most states act pragmatically to protect children and to respect
parents’ wishes. States have developed three different methods by which
parents can direct how to care for their children in this situation: by will,
by petition, or through another statutorily created mechanism, such as the
71. LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS, supra note 38, at 267-68.
72. Alan Guttmacher Institute, Minors’ Access to STD Services (2006), available at http://
www.agi-usa.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MASS.pdf.
73. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
74. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45aB606 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-5-4 (2004); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 34-1-102(c) (2004).
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increasingly available option of “standby guardianships.”75 A guardian-
ship by will only comes into effect when both parents are dead, and it is
the selection of the last surviving parent that controls. The other two means
of creating long-term guardianships can occur while one (or both) parents
are living.
Parents select a testamentary guardian through their will. Under the
Uniform Probate Code, the Uniform Guardianship & Protective Proceedings
Act (UGPPA), and in some states, a parent can also select a guardian
through an “other signed writing,” which includes durable powers of
attorney and other specific documents for appointing guardians.
If the parents have named a guardian in their will, courts will generally
defer to the parents’ wishes. Nonetheless, courts retain discretion to dis-
approve of the parental choice, and statutes in some states, such as
Arkansas, merely direct that the court give “due regard” to the parents’
testamentary request. In Florida, the court must consider the preferences
of a minor who is fourteen years or older as well as the person designated
by will.76
Courts typically apply a presumption in favor of the testamentary
appointment, but allow the presumption to be overcome based on, in the
words of a Pennsylvania court, “convincing reasons.”77 Moreover, regard-
less of what a will provides, the proposed guardian must file a request to
be named guardian and request that the court confirm the parent’s wishes.
Thus, the guardian must accept the appointment before it becomes effec-
tive; appointment is not automatic upon probate of a will.
When minors are fourteen or older, the UGPPA will defer to their
choice of guardian, unless the appointment is not in the best interest of the
child.78 Moreover, minors fourteen and older (and in some states, including
Colorado and Texas, twelve or older) as well as a limited group of inter-
ested others can object to the guardian nominated by a parent in a will.79
If the parents have not appointed a guardian or the appointed guardian
declines to accept the appointment, then courts will typically choose a rel-
75. Joyce McConnell, A Survey of State Guardianship Statutes: One Concept, Many
Applications, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 253 (2002).
76. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.312 (3) (2005). See In re Lewis Will, 74 N.Y.S. 2d 865 (Surr.
1947); Shanks v. Ross, 173 Ga. 55 (1931); Gardner v. Hall, 132 N.J. Eq. 64, 26 A.3d 79, aff’d,
31 A.2d 805 (1942); Bristol v. Brundage, 589 A.2d 1 (Conn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that tes-
tamentary guardian was presumptive guardian unless the appointment would be detrimental to
the child).
77. In re Slaughter, 738 A.2d 1013, 1017 (Pa. Super Ct. 1999); but see In re Heym, 19 Pa.
D. & C. 3d 748 (1980) (testamentary appointment only one of several considerations in apply-
ing a best-interest-of-the-child standard).
78. Uniform Guardianship & Protective Proceedings Act (UGPPA) § 206 (1997).
79. See id. § 203.
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ative who is the “next of kin.” Gay and lesbian parents and parents with
partners who have not legally adopted the children can try to protect the
surviving partner’s ability to serve as a guardian, but courts do not always
respect such testamentary choices.80 Guardians typically take physical cus-
tody of the minor, decide where the child will live, make educational and
medical decisions, and decide on religious training. Because they function
as the parent, they may also consent to the minor’s marriage or adoption
in most states.81 As guardians of the person, however, they do not have the
same financial responsibility as parents. Guardians are not legally obli-
gated to provide from their own funds for the minor and may receive
money payable for the support of the minor to the minor’s parent or
guardian under the terms of any statutory benefit or insurance system or
any private contract, devise, or trust; a minority of states permit a guardian
to petition the court for a reasonable compensation for their services as
guardian. Additionally, guardians are not liable to third persons by reason
of the parental relationship for acts of the minor.
The guardianship typically ends when the child is no longer a minor. In
addition, the child or another person may petition the court for removal of
the guardian, and the court will hold a hearing. To remove a guardian, the
petitioner must meet a strict standard; generally, removal is justified only
where the guardian has neglected her duties, rather than where removal
would be in the best interest of the child. In some states, in recognition 
of the seriousness of the petition, such as Connecticut, the guardian is
entitled to representation in removal proceedings.
By nominating a guardian, a parent can exercise strong control over the
future of the minor and can indicate her choices concerning the future care
of the minor.
On the other hand, there are several uncertainties associated with testa-
mentary guardians.82 First, the parent cannot be certain that the court will
accept her nomination because the appointment only takes effect once the
will is probated. Consequently, the parent cannot advocate on behalf of
her choice of guardian because she is dead when the will is probated. To
overcome this uncertainty, Colorado, Hawaii, and a few other states allow
80. See McGuffin v. Overton, 542 N.W.2d 288 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), appeal denied, 546
N.W. 2d 256 (Mich. 1996) (although biological mother had named lesbian partner as testamen-
tary guardian and as guardian through power of attorney, she did not have standing to challenge
an award of temporary custody to the biological father, even though the mother had explicitly
stated that she did not want the father to have custody because of his lack of relationship with
the children).
81. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. Code § 5-208.
82. See generally Carolyn McAllaster, Carol Suzuki, and Jeffrey Selbin, Issues in Family
Law for People with HIV, in AIDS AND THE LAW 393, 416–18 (2004).
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for court confirmation of the appointment prior to the parent’s death in
certain limited circumstances. In California, parents can request that the
court appoint a joint guardian who will serve concurrently with the parent
during her lifetime and who assumes sole responsibility when the parent
dies.83 This option is available however, only if the parent has a “terminal
condition.”84
The conventional approach to guardianships shows the state literally
acting in parens patriae, to protect minors like a parent. Although states
defer to the choices made by parents, courts also reserve the right to over-
turn those decisions when not in the best interests of the child. Take the
recent Colorado case involving Ripley Mae Flom-Sherwood, the fifteen-
month-old daughter of Sara and Stephen Sherwood.85 Her father, who had
just returned from a tour of active duty in Iraq, killed Sara, and then shot
himself. Ripley, who was at a neighbor’s during the shooting, went to live
with her maternal aunt and uncle, Sherry and Brian Villers.
Although Sara had not yet signed her will, the draft designated Kathleen
Taylor Nace, Stephen’s mother, as the testamentary guardian; Stephen, who
died shortly after Sara, had also designated his mother as the guardian in
his signed will.86 Although the grandmother accepted the appointment, the
Villers filed suit to challenge the testamentary guardianship.87 The court
ultimately upheld the challenge and directed that, based on this legally
permitted intervention by an interested party, a judge should appoint a
guardian “pursuant to the best interest of the child”88 who need not be the
testamentary guardian that had been designated by the last surviving parent.
A “strict father” approach might suggest that states require courts to
appoint, without any further review, the guardian designated by the par-
ent, and thus would advocate for a change in current laws to preclude
objections by other interested adults. Challenges by nonparents would
interfere with familial structure. Moreover, strict father adherents might
argue that children could never challenge a parentally designated appoint-
ment, as this would undermine the family hierarchy.
83. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2105(f) (2005).
84. Id.
85. In re R.M.S., 128 P.3d 783 (Colo. 2006); Monte Whaley, Soldier’s Marriage Was in
Trouble, DENVER POST, Aug. 7, 2005, p. C1.
86. R.M.S., 128 P.3d at 784 n.2. At any rate, the designation of the parent who dies second
controls.
87. The governing Colorado statute allows a person who has the “care or custody of the
minor” to prevent or terminate a parental testamentary appointment. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-
203(1) (2005).
88. R.M.S., 128 P.3d at 788; see COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-204(2) (2005) (allowing for jud-
icial appointment to be made in the “minor’s best interest”).
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By contrast, a nurturant parent approach might allow for children
younger than twelve to be consulted with respect to the appropriate
guardian choice, to ensure their involvement in the process and funda-
mental fairness to them. It would counsel continuance of the current
approach of allowing those interested in the child’s welfare to object to
testamentary appointments.
3. WHEN THE STATE CANNOT PROTECT MINORS
The ability of a state to act in any manner—the country governance
context—is critical in an examination of state capacity to represent chil-
dren’s interests. The first two examples discussed in this paper, adolescent
abortion and orphan guardianship, involve an effective state that is regu-
lating the family. But what happens when the state is either unable or
unwilling to regulate? In the United States, the DeShaney, Suter, and Castle
Rock Supreme Court decisions concern the inability to enforce various
seemingly mandated state actions and are examples of an unwillingness to
regulate and enforce.89 But there are countries that are unable to act.
Consider the problem of child “sorcerers.” In several sub-Saharan
Africa countries, there is an epidemic of child “witchcraft.”90 Witchcraft
is not, of course, a new phenomenon in sub-Saharan Africa; there were
accounts of Africans blaming witches for various misfortunes throughout
the twentieth century.91 It is accusations against children, however, that
distinguish these new forms from previous witchcraft epidemics.
The process of accusing children generally begins when an important
family member, such as the child’s mother, dies. The father may take a
new wife, or the children may be sent to other family members, thereby
beginning the process of treating such children differently. When a family
seeks advice from a preacher to help in curing its problems, the pastor
may blame these children, particularly if they are handicapped in some
way. The family may then hire the priest to exorcise the household of the
child sorcerer. After the exorcism, the child is sent out of the home, unable
89. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Suter v.
Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992); Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
90. The following account is drawn from a variety of sources, including LYNNE CRIPE ET
AL., ABANDONMENT AND SEPARATION OF CHILDREN IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
16–18 (2002); Human Rights Watch, What Future? Street Children in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, available at http://hrw.org/reports/2006/dr0406.
91. ADAM ASHWORTH, WITCHCRAFT, VIOLENCE, AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA 89
(2005). Ashworth suggests that at times of social change, witchcraft is more likely to be per-
ceived because “there is manifestly more misfortune to be explained; conditions conducive to
fomenting jealousy and hatred arise; procedures that previously served to hold jealousy and
resentment in check decline in effectiveness; and alternative interpretations of misfortune lose
credibility.” Id.
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to return. In this context, family members and the church attempt to assert
claims on behalf of children, either by accusing them of sorcery or “heal-
ing” them of sorcery.
In countries, such as England or the United States, it is the state that 
protects these children through the child abuse and neglect system and 
the criminal prosecution system.92 In England, there have been several
highly publicized cases of state involvement in protecting children from
accusations of witchcraft. Child protection authorities have taken custody
of the children, and the accusers and torturers have been criminally pros-
ecuted.93 High-level governmental commissions have been established,
news media have reported on the issues extensively, and the state has 
handled the few reported cases carefully.
By contrast, in countries such as the Congo and Angola, the state is
dysfunctional and cannot provide protection to these children.94 Very few,
if any, parents or pastors have been, or could be, prosecuted, even though
individual members of the government may recognize the problem.95
There may be no applicable laws that define child abuse and neglect, no
authority charged with child protection, and no facility to house endangered
children. In such a state, multilateral institutions, bilateral aid agencies,
and international nongovernmental organizations can exert pressure on
the national government and other institutions within a country where they
have programs. Moreover, indigenous nongovernmental organizations,
individuals, and responsible government officials can pressure institutions
from within the country (often with external support).
Thus, while states may be unable, or unwilling, to protect children,
nongovernmental organizations have been successful in drawing attention
to the problems facing children, and in providing services to help them.96
Nongovernmental organizations also have been successful in fostering
92. See generally Stewart Tendler and Nicola Woolcock, Police Fear for Children Abused
by Religious Sects, THE TIMES (Dec. 12, 2005), available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/arti-
cle/ 0,,2-1921773,00.html.
93. See, e.g., BBC News, “Witch” Child Trio Guilty, June 3, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ england/london/4607435.stm.
94. International Crisis Group, Cote d’Ivoire: Peace as an Option, May 17, 2006, available
at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id’3848&f’1; BBC News, Angola Witchcraft
Child’s Victims, July 13, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4677969.
stm (four days after reporter who contacted Angolan child abuse authorities about the mistreat-
ment of an alleged child witch was assured that situation would be handled quickly, the child
died without any intervention).
95. See Julie-Ann Davies, Witch-Hunt, NEW HUMANIST (Mar. 1, 2004), available at
http://www.newhumanist.org.uk/volume119issue2_more.php?id’589_0_26_0_C.
96. For thoughtful discussions of the role of civil society, see, e.g., Miriam Galston, Civic
Renewal and the Regulation of Nonprofits, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 289 (2004).
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recognition of children’s rights internationally and in pressuring countries
to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).97 Especially
where the government cannot protect children, civil society actors play an
important role, but even in countries with stable governments, civil soci-
ety has become more active in advocating and protecting children’s rights.
Civil society groups play multiple roles in both developed and developing
countries: they may advocate on behalf of specific children or on behalf
of groups of children, operate centers for children, or lobby for enactment
of the CRC.
For example, the nongovernmental organization, Save the Children,
has investigated child witches, operated centers for helping to rehabilitate
them, and then attempted to reunite them with their families in Kinshasa,
Congo. In the United States, we would expect the state or federal govern-
ment to provide these services or at least to fund them.98 But Save the
Children receives funding from other governments and does not operate
under a contract with the Congolese government. Human Rights Watch
recently advocated enactment of a children’s code that would criminalize
accusations of sorcery against children and create facilities for juveniles
that would serve as alternatives to imprisonment.99
The state’s obligations are clear under international law. Various inter-
national documents assign the state the responsibility of protecting chil-
dren. The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (which has been signed but not ratified by the United States),
requires that states undertake “[s]pecial measures of protection and 
assistance on behalf of children,”100 the International Convention on the
Rights of the Child (to which the U.S. is not a signatory, although all other
countries in the world are), states that the government of each signatory
nation is ultimately responsible for taking care of the children within its
borders.101 In other words, the government of each country that has 
ratified the Convention assumes direct responsibility for taking care of
children and protecting them against abuse and neglect. Notwithstanding
97. Jude L. Fernando, Children’s Rights: Beyond the Impasse, 575 ANNALS 8, 13 (2001).
98. On the private provision of public services for children, see Susan Vivian Mangold,
Protection, Privatization and Profit in the Foster Care System, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 1295, 1312–13
(1999).
99. Tony Tate, Summary of Comments on Street Children and Juvenile Justice Issues in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (Nov. 8, 2005), available at http://www.jubileecampaign.org/
home/jubilee/street_children/Tony_Tate_statement.pdf.
100. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 10 (3). Jan. 3,
1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
101. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 2, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/25 (1989).
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the rhetoric of responsibility, these obligations are impossible to enforce
where there is no functioning state, including no noncorrupt judicial sys-
tem and no legal representation for children.
Instead, the lesson of focusing on rights discourse for work overseas is
that the debate has to be grounded in the empirical data on children’s
needs for health, education, training, and shelter, not in constitutional and
public conflicts;102 and that the state may be unable to provide these basic
needs that recognize children’s “dependency” rights.103 Establishing state-
recognized rights by, for example, suing to enforce provisions of interna-
tional or even domestic charters granting children the right to freedom of
expression, is less urgent than enforcing the dependency right to universal
and free education;104 and the enforcer as well as the provider may well
not be the state, but nongovernmental organizations and civil society actors.
Accordingly, rather than  the paradigmatic triangle of parents, children,
and the state, we must think of a rectangular pyramid that places children
at the top, but has a base that includes family, state, international actors,
and, as the final point, civil society and other nongovernmental actors.105
Unlike the situation in most developed countries, the main actor in devel-
oping countries is not the government, but nongovernmental organiza-
tions106 and the aid community (including multilateral institutions such as
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which are
often significant players in advocating for reform).107
Civil society organizations are highly relevant to discussions of how to
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advance children’s rights in developing countries. When governments are
not democracies and are not accountable to their citizens, nongovernmen-
tal organizations and international, multilateral organizations and institu-
tions represent possible sources of advocacy for children because they
function outside of the state bureaucracy.108 To some extent, conceptual
categories of strict father and nurturant parents are irrelevant, because
both the state and the family are themselves nonfunctioning, and any dif-
fering visions of each with respect to representing children simply cannot
be implemented. Instead, it is the role of others, of entities aside from the
state or parents, who must intervene to support children.
V. Conclusion
The state’s claim that it can represent children’s interests plays a 
significant role in defining the structure of families, the relationships
within families, and the development of children’s interests. Depending
on the context, the state may be serving its own interest when it claims to
be acting in a child’s best interest, as when it regulates minors’ abortions,
it may be according primary value to children’s interests, as is the case
with guardians appointed once both parents are dead—or the state may be
completely unable to serve anyone’s interests. Children have different
needs for third-party understanding of their situations, depending on the
posture of state, parent, and other institutional actors. And the state’s role
ranges from nurturing independence in children, allowing them to make 
decisions for themselves, to reinforcing authoritative decision-making by
their parents, or, in the absence of parents, by the state itself. The state
asserts various claims on behalf of children—and itself—that, at times,
reinforce parental authority or children’s independence. In the United
States, in culturally contested areas such as abortion, states have adopted
different policies that reflect specific moral views of families, and that
either support parental hierarchy or children’s development.109 Outside of
the United States, in dysfunctional countries, it is the entities outside of
the traditional triangle of child, parent, and state that are helping to respect
children’s interests.
108. Peter Spiro, The Democratic Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations:
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